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IN THE SUPRE~E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
h'A:JDA SANDBERG, WANDA SANDBERG, 
Administratrix of the ESTATE OF 
~AYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY 
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG 
\:iv \~ANDA SANDBERG, her Guardia~, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN, 
JANE DOE and all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, title 
or interest in the real property 
described in Plaintiff's Complaint 
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership 
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' 
title thereto, 
AND 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
In the Matter of the ESTATE 
OF 
\,JAYNE SANDBERG, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
CASE NO. 15146 
Appellants filed their action to quiet title to 391.84 acres 
of unimproved real property in St. George, Utah, and Respondent 
filed a counterclaim seeking specific performance of an option 
granted by Sandbergs to Respondent. 
-1-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PROCEEDINGS DELO~ AND DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL CCCRT 
After the filing of the Complaint, and pursuant to a stipula-
tion of the parties, the trial court entered an order consolida 
the civil action with a probate proceeding in which the same issue:; 
were pending and granted leave to Respondent to file a CountercLti~ 
(R. 353-54). Appellants' Complaint is in the record at page 1, and 
Respondent's Counterclaim is in the record at page 166._h/ 
Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Memorandrnn 
and an AmendcJ :·lemorandur:: in support thereof (R.171, 173, 215). 
Respondent filed a ~lotion for Summary Judgment and a Memorandum in 
support thereof (R 3~~.269). The two Motions came on for hearing 
before the trial court on Xarch 15, 1977. At that hearing the 
trial court engaged counsel in a careful and penetrating dialogue 
wherein both counsel made repeated assurances that there were no 
issues of fact and that the matter could be properly disposed of on 
the Motions and the materials in the file. The lower court noted 
that the matter was set for trial and indicated a willingness to 
hear the Motions only if counsel agreed there were no facts in 
dispute and that the trial setting could be vacated. Counsel 
repeatedly insisted that such was the case and agreed to vacate th2 
trial setting and proceed on the Motions (transcript of Harch 15th. 
at 5-8). Thereafter, the Motions were argued to the court, and 
_J./ The references to the record are to the civil file since the 
probate file contains no material facts that are not in the 
civil file. 1-!rs. Sandberg remarried prior to the commencec•en: 
of the action and her correct name is now Kurt. Since t!1e 
documents are in the name of Sandberg, the election has been 
made by both parties to refer to the principal Appel~ant os 
Mrs. Sandberg. It should be noted, however, that rerere:nc 2 
to the Sandberg deposition apply to the deposition of ' .. 'a:ll:: 
Kurt. 
-2-
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after having taken the matter under advisement, the court, on March 
24, 1977, signed an ORDER denying Appellants' motion, granting 
t\espondent' s Motion, ordering specific performance by Appellants 
and directing Respondent to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 357-359). 
On April 7, 1977, Counsel for Respondent mailed to the Court 
and to Appellants' counsel, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance (R.369-
385 and 386-391). The Court signed the Findings and Conclusions 
and the Judgment on April 11, (R.384, 391) and the same were entered 
on April 19, 1977 (R. 369, 386). 
Contrary to and inconsistent with Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, Appellants on April 15, 1977, filed general and 
non-specific Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 361) and noticed the Objections for hearing in Richfield, 
Utah, on May 25, 1977. On that same date, April 15th, Appellants 
filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the prelimi-
nary Order of the Court that was signed on March 24, 1977 (R. 363). 
On May 24, 1977, the day before the hearing on the Objections 
in Richfield, Appellants' counsel hand-delivered to Respondent's 
counsel more particularized objections to the Findings and Con-
clusions (R. unnumbered but following page 396 and filed in the 
Supreme Court on June 16, 1977). The trial court, sitting in 
~ichfield on May 25, 1977, declined to consider Appellants' Objec-
tions because the Court concluded that it had been divested of 
Jurisdiction as a result of the Notice of Appeal filed by the 
~ppellants on April 15, 1977. On June 6, 1977, the trial court 
- 3-
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signed an order to that effect (filed in the Utah Supreme Court c· 
June 20th, in File i:!l527~). 
On June 3, 1977, Appellants filed a Motion for Order E::~eniJ -
Time in which to appeal from the Order and judgment and Decree 0 ~ 
Specific Performance entered on April 19th (unnumbered but filed~~ 
the Utah Supreme Court on June 16, 1977). On June 6th, counsel ~o: 
Respondent advised the Court by letter, with copy to Appellants' 
counsel, that he had no objection to the Court extending the appec.'. 
time in accordance with the motion of Appellants' counsel. On June 1 
13th the trial court signed an Order Extending Time for Filing 
Notice of Appeal fr:~: t:te Order and Judgment and Decree of SpeciLc 
Performance (filed in the Utah Supreme Court on June 20th in File 
#15274). On June 16th Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from tr.e 
Judgment entered on April 19th, 1977 (filed in the Utah Supreme 
Court on June 20th in file J.!152 74). 
PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITY 
The Appellants have failed to perfect their appeal from the 
final judgment of the court made on April 11th, and entered on 
April 19, 1977, and from which they filed their second notice of 
appeal. Rather, Appellants, on page 2 of their brief under the 
heading of "Di!>posi.tion in the Lower Court", assert that they are 
appealing from the Order of March 25th. The final judgment of t'ie 
court entered on April 19th has not been addressed by 
lants. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
\pprl-
Appellants seek reversal of the Summary Judgment as set ~or,~ 
in the preliminary Order of March 25, 1977. Respondent scc·::5 
-4-
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Jffirmation of the Order of March 25th and the final Judgment 
entered on April 19, 1977, the judgment which the Appellants do not 
iddress in their brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the hearing on the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, the 
parties affirmatively represented to the Court that the facts were 
not in dispute and that the Court could decide the case as a matter 
of law (T.5-8). After hearing argument and taking the matter under 
advisement, the court made and entered 38 specific Findings of Fact 
(R. 369-381). It should be noted that in their brief of 103 pages 
Appellants do not challenge specifically any single Finding of Fact 
as either controverted or as not supported by the evidence. Respond-
ent asserts that every Finding of Fact is amply supported by the 
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions and affidavits 
on file herein and that those facts are uncontroverted. 
Respondent respectfully submits that under these circumstances 
the only facts that need be reviewed are those facts set forth in 
the trial court's findings (R. 369-381). 
For this Court's convenience, it is noted that other than the 
Findings entered by the trial court, the best organized and most 
concise and convenient recitation of the facts is set forth in 
~espondent' s unchallenged, unobjected to and uncontroverted Affi-
davit (R.337-348) and the documents referred to therein and attached 
thereto as exhibits "A" through "U" (R. 294-336). 
The trial court's Findings rather clearly set forth the oper-
ative facts. In view of the isolated facts selected and distorted 
.1 ar::;ument by Appellants, Respondent feels compelled to restate 
-5-
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the material facts in a rnore orderly and less argurnentati'.'e fashi:· 
as follows: 
On April 4, 1962, Wayne Sandberg and Wanda Sandberg entered 
into an Earnest t~ney Receipt (Finding #2 R.370, R. 294) 
Respondent, Robert D. Klein, a right to purchase certain properties 
in Washington County, Utah. The original time period during 1-ll:ic~ 
Respondent had to convert the Earnest Money Receipt to an option 
was extended. On September 21, 1964, (after the death of Hayne 
Sandberg) Wanda Sandberg, in her individual capacity and in her 
capacity as the legal representative of Wayne Sandberg, and 
Respondent entered in;::a the Option Agreement anticipated by the 
Earnest Money Receipt (Finding {,!5 R. 371, R. 298). 
Pursuant to the Earnest Money Receipt and the Option Agree-
rnent, Respondent made the following payments to Mrs. Sandberg (Fir.c· 
ing #10 R.372, Klein Affidavit #12 R339): 
June 14, 1962 
December 14, 1962 
June 14, 1963 
December 14, 1963 
June 14, 1964 
December 14, 1964 
June 14, 1965 
December 14, 1965 
June 14, 1966 
December 14, 1966 
June 14, 196 7 
December 14, 1967 
June 14, 1968 
December 14, 1968 
June 14, 1969 
December 14, 1969 
June 14, 1970 
December 14, 1970 
June 7, 1971 (down payment to 
commence June 15, 1971 agree-
ment) 
TOTAL 
-6-
$ 500.00 
500.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
1,000.00 
$17,000.00 
2,000.00 
$19,000.00 
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On March 30, 1971, Respondent delivered a letter to Mrs. 
Sandberg expressing his intention to exercise the option. In that 
letter he proposed a slight change in the property description, 
referred to a requested survey, and indicated that he would on or 
before June 15, 1971, make a down payment of $2,000.00 cash which 
was required to exercise the option (Finding #9 R.372, R.305-307). 
Wanda Sandberg received the letter (Finding #9 R.372, Sandberg 
Answers to Request for Admissions #8 R.133-134). 
The property is described in the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Option Agreement by section numbers with a specific exclusion 
therefrom of certain property lying east of an established and 
identified fence. Mrs. Sandberg and Respondent walked the fence 
together and established the fence as the east boundary of the 
property being sold in accordance with the terms of the agreements 
(Finding #28 R.378, Sandberg Deposition 14-15, Klein Affidavit #22 
R.343). The fence meandered and a survey was required to establish 
the precise location thereof to make possible the computation of 
the acreage and the purchase price (Finding #13 R.373 Finding #28 
1 R.373, Finding #15, R.340, Klein Affidavit #22 R.343, #15 R.340, 
#17 R.340, Stevens Affidavit #4 R.26, Sandberg Deposition 13). 
Thereafter, and during the first week in April, 1971, Mrs. Sandberg 
and Respondent met with Howard Stevens, a professional surveyor. 
~ey discussed a survey for purposes of determining the location of 
the fence and the computation of the acreage and for purposes of 
preparing a plat for annexation of the Sandberg property to the 
City of St. George. (Finding #13 R.373, Klein Affidavit jf15 
i~O. Stevens Affidavit R.263). Mrs. Sandberg agreed to the 
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survey and agreed to pay one-half (1/2) of the cost thereof 
(Finding #13 R.374, Klein Affidavit ~15 R.340, Stevens Affidavi: 
---
R.264). At a subsequent ceeting with Respondent and the surveyo~ 
Mrs. Sandberg, for econo~ic reasons, requested that the survev ce 
delayed to near the time when she would be receiving the first 
annual payment (June, 1972), and Respondent acquiesced therein 
(Finding #16 R.375, Klein Affidavit #18 R.341, Stevens Affidavit 
R. 264). The survey was delayed as an acco;?,odation to Mrs. Sandbe:: 
Consequently, the completion and execution of the Real Estate 
purchase Contract was delayed because an appropriate legal des-
cription excluding the land east of the meandering fence could 
not be obtained and the acreage being sold and the purchase price 
could not be determined without the survey (Finding #28 R.378, 
Klein Affidavit #15 R.340, Sandberg Deposition 12-13). 
Notwithstanding that the Real Estate Purchase Contract had 
not been concluded, Respondent on June 7, 1971, delivered to :·!-:-s. 
Sandberg a check in the amount of $2,000.00 with an endorsement 
on the face thereof to the effect that it constituted a "down 
payment to cormnence June 15 agreement, 1971" (Finding {;11 R. 373, 
Klein Affidavit #13 R. 339, R. 308-309). Mrs. Sandberg accepted 
and cashed the check. At that same tine, Mrs. Sandberg conveyed 
to Respondent a parcel of 40 acres (Finding #14 R.374, Klein 
Affidavit #15 R.340, R.311), which conveyance was pursuant to the 
-8-
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:2lease provisions set forth in the Option Agreement,--1/the 
cerms of which were to be embodied in the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (R. 300). 
llrs. Sandberg and Respondent met with the St. George Planning 
~JrJ:lission with respect to the annexation. At that meeting, 11rs. 
S:ndberg represented that Respondent was purchasing the property 
1 ~inding #12 R.373, Klein Affidavit #14 R.340). An annexation plat 
· .. as prepared and executed by l1rs. Sandberg and Respondent and 
a?proved by the City of St. George. The plat annexed to the City 
of St. George not only property being purchased by Respondent, but 
contiguous property East of the meandering fence being retained by 
::rs. Sandberg (R.109). 
On June 7, 1971, Mrs. Sandberg and Respondent met with the 
·.:ashington County Commission and requested establishment of a 
S'Jrvey monument which would reduce the cost of the survey (Finding 
015 R. 374, Klein Affidavit jfl7 R. 340). The Washington County 
Co:;m1ission agreed to have the survey monument established (Finding 
'15 R. 374, Klein Affidavit #17 R. 341, R.312). The Respondent paid 
ell of the costs incident to the annexation and a nominal fee 
c~arged by the County Commission for the establishment of a survey 
~onument (Finding #36 R.380, Klein Affidavit #17 R.341, R.313). 
'! Respondent calculated in his letter of !>larch 30th that under 
the terms of the release provisions in the Option Agreement he 
would be entitled to a release and conveyance to him of 55 
acres upon exercise and the payment of the cash down payment 
of $2,000.00 required to exercise the Option. Respondent did 
not insist upon the conveyance of the other 15 acres because 
he was uncertain at that time of which 15 acres he wanted 
released and conveyed. (Klein Deposition p.9). 
-9-
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In April of 1972, Respondent approached Mrs. Sandberg about 
the survey and she then for the first time refused to discuss the 
matter with Respondent (Finding #17 R.375, Klein Affidavit Jl9 
R. 342). Respondent authorized the surveyor to proceed and Respor,,1-
ent paid for the cost of the survey (Finding #17 R.375, Klein 
Affidavit #19 R.342). 
Respondent received a letter dated April 20, 1972, from Appel-
lants' counsel (Royal K. Hunt) wherein he asserted that Respondent 
had exercised the option as to only 40 acres and had not paid the 
$1,000.00 required in December of 1971, and that because thereof 
the option was not in good standing and was terminated. Counsel 
for Appellants did not then assert any other reason for their 
refusal to proceed (R.314). 
On or about lfay 12, the surveyor completed the survey and 
I 
provided a legal description of those sections being sold to Responc-1 
ent which description excluded all of the property east of the 
fence (Finding #20 R.376, Klein Affidavit #22 R.342, R.264, 319, 
320, 321, 328, 335). The survey and the descriptions completed and 
prepared by the surveyor were transmitted to Mrs. Sandberg on or 
about May 16, 1972 (Finding #21 R.377, R.322). 
On or about May 16, 1972, Respondent prepared, executed and 
transmitted to Mrs. Sandberg a Real Estate Purchase Contract (R.J:-
which contract used the description prepared by the surveyor. T11 E 
Real Estate Purchase Contract was consistent with all of the maten'. 
terms and conditions of the sale set forth in the Earnest Monev 
Receipt and the Option Agreement, including the legal descrirtio~s 
of the property according to the parties' understanding t 11c1·eof • 
-10-
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Lhc consideration to be paid therefor (Finding #37 R.380). On or 
about June 1, 1972, Respondent tendered to Mrs. Sandberg a Cash-
ier's Check in the amount of $8,624.8Lf which was the calculated 
first annual installment required to be made under the terms of the 
Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract (Finding #22 
R.377, R.329, 330). Mrs. Sandberg received the tendered check and 
returned the same to Respondent (Finding #22 R.377, Klein Affidavit 
J24 R.343, Sandberg Deposition P.35). 
On or about June 13, 1972, Respondent addressed a letter to 
Mrs. Sandberg and enclosed with that letter a Cashier's Check in 
lhe amount of $68,359.94, in full payment of the balance due under 
the Option (Finding #23, R.377, Klein Affidavit #25 R.343, R.331, 
332). On July 11, 1972, Appellants' counsel returned the Cashier's 
Check in the amount of $68, 359. 94 to Respondent's counsel (Finding 
#24 R.378, Klein Affidavit #27 R.344, R.336). 
The Option Agreement did not specify who was to prepare the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract. Respondent took the initiative and 
prepared the same, but preparation was delayed because of Mrs. 
Sandberg's expressed desire to delay survey expenses (Finding #16 
R.375, Finding #29 F.379, Finding #34 R.380, Klein Affidavit #18 
R.341, Stevens Affidavit R.264, Klein Deposition P.14-15). Mrs. 
Sandberg has never specifically objected to any of the terms and 
2onditions set forth in the Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared 
by Respondent, nor has she ever objected to the real property 
~escription prepared by the surveyor, Howard Stevens (Finding #35 
0
.3805). tlrs. Sandberg, after December of 1971, represented to 
,ird parties that Respondent had purchased the property (Finding 
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#36 R.380 Sandberg Deposition P.51-52). Prior to exercising the 
option, Respondent paid and Mrs. Sandberg received and accepted 
$17,000.00. At the time of exercise, June 7, 1971, Respondl'nt 
paid and Mrs. Sandberg accepted a $2,000.00 dow'Tl payment. Rcspo~,.~. 
ent expended time, energy and money in having a survey monuli'.cnt 
established, having the property annexed to the City of St. Geor;::c:, 
and in having the property surveyed, all in reliance on his havin; 
exercised the option and in reliance upon Mrs. Sandberg 1 s ackno11lec:· 
ment thereof (Finding if37 R. 380). Mrs. Sandberg repeatedly ackno·,;-
ledged and confirmed the existence of the option and Respondent's 
interest in the Fr')?Cl"C/ and accepted through June of 1971, withoc.:: 
objection, Respondent's timely payments of all amounts due in 
connection with the transaction (Finding #38 R.380). 
On April 8, 1974, Appellants filed this action in the Distric: 
Court in and for Washington County, State of Utah (R. 1). In their 
Complaint, Appellants affirmatively allege that Wanda Sandberg and 
Wayne Sandberg granted to Respondent an option to purchase the 
subject property (R.3 1f10). The subject property described in the 
Complaint is the same property described in the Earnest :·!oney 
Receipt and is identical to the survey description prepared by the 
surveyor (Finding #20 R.376, Klein Affidavit #22 R.342, R.2, 3, 
R.328), which is also the identical description included in the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract prepared and executed by Respondent 
(R.324-328), and is the property for which Respondent seeks soec-
ific performance of the Option Agreement. 
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POINTS I AND II 
STANDARDS FOR AND SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Respondent has no quarrel with the section of Appellants' 
~rief dealing with the scope of judicial review in this case. It 
is well established in Utah that the Supreme Court may review the 
facts as well as the law in equity cases before it. However, 
Appellants' inference on pages 22-23 of their brief that summary 
judgment was inappropriate in this easel/ is directly contrary to 
the representations of Appellants' counsel before the trial court. 
At the hearing on the cross Motions for Summary Judgment on 
>larch 15, 1977, the trial court engaged counsel in a penetrating 
colloquy respecting the advisability of deciding this case on 
Summary Judgment. The trial court stated: 
Okay, I don't want you to dodge around be-
cause I am going to tie you down right now. 
What I am saying is that' are you prepared 
do you want to argue this on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment or are you prepared to 
stipulate that this case may be submitted 
to the Court as a question of law based upon 
your statement of facts as set forth in your 
Motion for Summary Judgment? (T.6). 
This question was particularly important since trial in the matter 
~as calendared just two weeks hence on March 28, 1977. After 
counsel for all parties stipulated that the matter would be dis-
J./ In their brief at pages 22-23, Appellants state: 
"It is incredible that the lower court could find, 
before one witness had taken the stand, that the evidence in 
the file considered favorably to the Appellants met the high 
evidentiary standard required to support a decree for specific 
performance in favor of the Respondent 
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posed of by Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court stated further 
All right, the record should indicate that 
both sides have stipulated -- now, listen 
to me, gentlemen, I think there should be 
no question about why we are here and what 
vou have done. The record should indicate 
~hat both parties have made a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and the Court has advised 
counsel that if there's a question of 
law[sic] that the Court felt that the 
Motions for Surrunary Judgment should be 
continued till the time of trial, which was 
on March 28th. Both parties stipulate 
there was no issue of fact, subject that 
the Affidavit filed this morning would be 
considered as part of the fact. 
MR. COWLEY: Uncontroverted. 
THE CO[~! ~~controverted fact. So 
conseq~ently it appears to the Court that 
this case can be submitted to the Court on 
the issue of law, period, and the Court 
will find -- make a decision based on the 
law in this case. 
MR. CO\.JLEY: We so understand, your Honor. 
MR. THOMPSON: We so understand and we so 
stipulate. (T. 7). 
The propriety of the disposition of this case by means of 
Motions for Surrunary Judgment is something that Appellants should 
not now be heard to raise on appeal, even inferentially. 
While Appellants suggest that the Findings entered by the 
trial court do not reflect the facts, they do not in their brief of 
103 pages specifically challenge any single particular Finding as 
either controverted or as unsubstantiated by the record. Nor do 
they in their brief even make reference to the Findings of the 
trial court. That the facts in this case are not in dispute is 
further evidenced by Appellants' argument at pages 18-19 of their 
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brief that this case should not be remanded for any reason, but 
that this Court should make new Findings and enter judgment for 
rhem. Respondent submits that if the Findings of the trial court 
~ere unreflective of the facts, Appellants would have found room in 
cheir 103 page brief to specifically point out the claimed incon-
sistencies. Without even a single specific challenge to any one 
of the Findings of the trial court, this Court has no good reason 
to now look behind those Findings. Each of the authorities cited 
by Appellants for the proposition that the Supreme Court in equity 
cases can make Findings and enter judgment is a case in which 
specific challenges were made to the Findings of the trial court. 
Appellants have cited no authorities in which the Supreme Court has 
disturbed the Findings of the lower court when Appellants have made 
no specific objections to the Findings. With no specific challenge 
to the Findings, this Court should concern itself only with the 
legal issues, notwithstanding its power to review the facts in 
equity cases. 
POINT III 
RESPONDENT HAS MET THE STANDARDS 
OF PROOF NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE 
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF SPECIFIC PERFORl-f..ANCE 
Point III of Appellants' brief is merely a statement of the 
evidentiary standard that must be met in order to support a decree 
~or specific performance. Respondent does not disagree with the 
1uoted proposition in Appellants' brief that specific performance 
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requires a contract that is 
and 
free from doubt, vagueness and ambiquity 
and that it must be sufficiently certain 
and definite in its terms to leave no 
reasonable doubt as to what the parties 
intended, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 
Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (1963). 
The evidence of the making of the contract 
must be clear and convincing, or as stated 
in some cases, clear, cogent and convincing, 
or strong and conclusive. 71 Arn.Jur. 2d 
Specific Performance §208 (1973). 
/.,' 
Appellants urged this same standard on the trial court belo1.'-' ' 
and the trial court had the standard in mind when it decided the 
case and entered j~d~~e~t against Appellants. The record herein 
and ~he unchallenged Findings of Fact clearly demonstrate that the 
burden of proof necessary to support the Order of March 15th and 
the Order and Judgment and Decree of Specific Performance entered 
on April 19th has been clearly met. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT A DEFENSE 
Appellants suggest, for the first time on this appeal, that 
since Mrs. Sandberg refused to execute the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (the very performance sought by Respondent and ordered ~ 
the lower court) that the statute of frauds relieves them from 
their contractual duty to perform their prior written and executec 
_.!!_/ In their Memorandum (R.173) and Amended Memorandum (R.215) . 
filed in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Appel-,_ 
lanes argued that the Option Agreement in question was. vo~cJJ~' 
as un~uly vague and ambiguous, that the option was untin;eiv ,, . 
ex~rcised, ~nd that the option expired by its own terrs ..-:ith · 
being exercised as to the property in question. The trial . 
court specifically found against Appellants on these n~a:tc::·· 
(R.358, 378, 379). 
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1greements. The inherent defect in such an argument make it 
"wrthy of little comment. 
First, it is axomatic that the Supreme Court will not consider 
an issue which was not considered by the court below and which is 
r1ised for the first time on appeal. Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 
29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (197 3); State By and Through Road Com-
mission v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. 
Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1970); In re Ekker's Estate, 
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967). At no time in the proceedings before the 
lower court did Appellants raise any issue respecting the statute 
of frauds. Based on the above cited authorities, this Court should 
not now consider an issue which was neither mentioned nor considered 
by the lower court. 
Second, even if the issue is considered by this Court, the 
statute of frauds does not apply to the circumstances presented by 
this case. This is not a case in which Respondent is seeking to 
enforce an oral agreement to convey land. The agreements in this 
case have all been written. Wayne and Wanda Sandberg executed the 
Earnest Money Receipt (Finding #2 R.370), Mrs. Wanda Sandberg 
executed the Option Agreement (Finding #5 R.371). Both agreements 
~ere in writing and both agreements contemplated the sale and 
:ransfer of the real property in question. The preparation and 
exeuction of the Real Estate Purchase Contract was delayed, as an 
0ccomodation to Mrs. Sandberg, but it merely embodied the terms of 
:\e prior written and executed agreements (Findings {/21, 29 R. 377, 
.;9). A written agreement was present at every step of the convey-
''Cc> of real property in this case. By its very terms, the statute 
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of frJ.uds, l'.tJ.h Code Ann. §25-5-1 (1953), Joes not a?pl:.· to ::'.ec 
facts of this case because of the •.,Titings that are ur:dis?uL1:,: 
part of the record. 
Third, even if the contract in question were an oral a~ree-
ment, the statute of frauds '"'ould a\·ail Appellants nothing bcc:i1~se 
the Joctrine of part performance would take this case out of the 
- f - d 51 purview ot the statute o trau s.- Utah Code Ann. §25-5-8 (195:;; 
states: 
Nothing in this chapter [statute of frauds] 
containcc shall be construed to abridge the 
po~er~ -~ c.~r:s to compel the specific per-
for~ance :~ aireements in case of part per-
for23~ce =~e~eof. 
_21 The doctrine of part performance in Utah is explained in 
detail in Randall v. Tracy Collins Trust Companv, 6 Utah 2d 
18, 305 P.2d 480 (1956). While it is not necessary to apply 
this doctrine here because of the acknowledged writings, t!1e 
undisputed facts of this case would meet the requirements for 
the operation of the doctrine as set forth by the court in 
Randall: 
The Statute of Frauds, Section 25-5-1, Utah Code Annota:2: 
(1953) requires promises to convey interests in land to 
be in writing; but Section 25-5-8 allows part perforT":ance 
to remove an oral contract from the Statute. The essence 
of the Utah doctrine of part performance is found in 
three cases: Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P.218 
Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P.767, 8 L.R.A.N.S., 870 
and Van Natta v. Heywood, 57 Utah 376, 195 P. 192. 
Excluding the problem of value of services, three generJ! 
criteria emerge in removing an oral contract from the , 
Statute of Frauds by part performance. First, the ora. 
contract and its terms must be clear and definite; secc·~.­
the acts done in performance of the contract must be 
equally clear and definite; and third, the acts must b2 
in reliance on the contract. Such acts in reliance Gus: 
be such that a) they would not have been performed ~ad 
the contract not existed, and b) the failure to er:J~ 
on ~he part of the promiser would result in frau on :~e 
per~ormer who relied, since dar..ages ·.:ould be ina ··· ·_i'O'.. 
Relinace may be made in innucerable wavs, all of 1c~ 
could refer exclusively to the contrac~. Id. at 
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" .. Jisputcd fdcts in this case clearly establish part performance 
J :·;rs. Sandberg and Respondent. On June 7, 1971, Respondent 
Lc~dered a down payment to Mrs. Sandberg which was accepted and 
cashed (Finding #11 R.373). Pursuant to the release provisions 
2i the option, which provisions were, upon Respondent's exer-
cise thereof, to be embodied in the contract, Mrs. Sandberg 
::".ade a partial conveyance of the property to Respondent on June 
1, 1971 (Finding #14 R.374). In reliance on the agreement of 
~Jpellants to convey the property, Respondent made substantial 
Jayments over the years which were accepted; Respondent expended 
::~e. energy and money in having a survey monument established 
~~ in having the property annexed to the City of St. George; 
~cspondent had the property surveyed; and Respondent had the 
~al Estate Sales Contract prepared. Partial performance by 
J2th parties bars a statute of frauds defense. 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellants' arguments relating 
the statute of frauds should be dismissed as irrelevant. 
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a. 
POfoT V 
THE OPTIO:J AGREE'.!ENT IS CLEAR A'.'JD 
UNA:rnrcuous . .1.::D C..\P1'..l3LE OF SPECIFIC PE!ZFOR:·!Ai~CE 
Contracts Exoressl· L12avinz Material Terms to Future 
Contractua Agreement are Cncnforceable. 
Respondent finds it unnecessary to disagree with the leng 
and learned dissertation set forth under this heading on pages 32 
through 41 of Appellants' brief. It is noted that Appellants do 
not attempt to apply the law as stated to the facts in this case. 
It is suggested that their failure to do so is because the law as 
stated is not applicable to the facts at hand. The Option Agree-
ment (R.298-302) contains every essential, material term and 
leaves no te::cns ::o ;:·_:.ture agreement as is readily obvious from ever. 
a cursory reading of the document in question. 
b. The 0 tion Agreement was not an A reement to Agree but is 
a C ear, Unambiguous and Complete Agreement. 
The essence of Appellants' argument beginning on page 41 of 
their brief is that before the option could be exercised, a further 
agreement of the parties as to the amount of land being purchased 
was necessary, as well as future agreement as to the amount of ~~ 
payment and as to the choice of lands to be released to Respondent 
after the down payment was made. In each instance cited by Appel-
lants, the claimed necessity for future agreement is an al ternatire 
to a definite, fixed provision. That is the down payment, for 
example, is agreed to be $2,000.00, unless the parties mutuallY 
agree to something different. In the absence of a mutual agreeme:;: 
changing the fixed provision, the specific provision would bind t~i 
parties. 
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On page 40 of their brief, Appellants state: "there is author-
ity which seems to suggest that even leaving future agreement as an 
Jlternative to specified terms may result in a contract being found 
unenforceable." Appellants, however, fail to cite a single author-
ity that suggests anything of the sort. In this respect, Appel-
lants cite Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1947) for the proposition that providing for a future agreement 
only as an alternative renders a contract void. The holding of 
that case does not even approximate such a proposition. The court 
in Kline v. Rogerson stated the following as the sole issue for 
determination: "Was plaintiff the owner or holder of the check 
executed by defendant?" Contrary to Appellants' representation 
that the general phrase "or terms to mutual satisfaction" following 
very specific terms rendered the contract void, the specific terms 
of the contract were unenforceable simply because defendant had not 
signed the contract which meant he had not agreed to the specific 
terms. 
One of the paragraphs of the Option upon which Appellants rely 
in support of their proposition that further agreement is required 
is Paragraph 5: 
"The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase 
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dol-
lars ($200.00) per acre at any time during 
the option period, (including any extension 
period) by executing a contract to purchase 
all or such part or parts of the property 
as the parties may agree; such contract to 
purchase shall provide as follow: 
(R.300, Paragraph 5). 
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It is submitted that the only reasonable interpretation of th~ 
paragraph is that (1) Responucnt may exercise the option as to all 
of the property, or (2) Respondent may exercise as to a part or 
parts of the property as the parties may agree. 
The interpretation contended for by Appellants is an attempt 
to torture rather clear language into an ambiguity. Taking Appel-
lants interpretation, the result is that whenever the optionee 
attempted to exercise, he must first obtain the further agreement 
of the optionor. It is absurd to believe that over a nine year 
period Respondent paid and Appellants accepted 19 payments totaling 
$19, 000. 00 under c i:c ~·..::::stances where such payments would buy no-
thing for Respondent except as may thereafter be agreed to by 
Appellants. It is totally unreasonable to believe that such was the 
intention of the parties. 
There are several well established rules of construction that 
operate in this case to sustain the trial court's interpretation of 
the option as unambiguous. First, a construction giving an instru-
ment legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted when it 
can reasonably be done, and between two possible constructions, the 
construction that will establish a valid contract should be adop-
ted. Frailey v. McGar_£Y, 116 Utah 504, 211 P.2d 840, 847 (1949); 
Driggs v. Utah State Teachers Retirement Board, 105 Utah 2d 417, 
142 P.2d 657, 663 (1943). 
Second, if uncertainty exists as to the interpretation of a 
contract, the court will endeavor to give the contract a rational 
and just construction. Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Ste~drt. 4 
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L'cah 2d 228, 291 P.2d 890, 893 (1955). While Respondent denies 
that the option in question is uncertain in any respect, it is both 
·Jnj us t and unreasonable to assume, as Appellants contend in this 
case, that the parties intended that Respondent should pay Appel-
lant $19,000.00 over a nine year period and then only have the 
right to ask Appellants to agree to something. Without doubt, the 
parties always intended that the option covered all the land in 
certain described sections, excluding therefrom only certain land 
lying east of a meandering fence. 
Third, if a contract contains general and special provisions 
relating to the same thing, the specific provisions control. Desbien 
1 v. Penokee Farmers Union Co-Op, Ass'n., 552 P.2d 917, 923 (Kan. 1976); 
West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co .. , 536 P.2d 393, 397 (Okl.App. 1974); 
~yburn v. Crawford, 187 Or. 386, 211 P.2d 483, 488 (1949); Crecente 
v. Vernier, 53 N.M. 188, 204 P.2d 785, 790-91 (1949); Morgan v. 
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948); 
Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Markham, 106 Colo. 509, 107 P. 2d 
313, 316 (1940). Each provision of the contract cited by Appellants 
in their arguments that future agreement was required contains a 
specific provision followed by the phrase which indicates that 
other arrangements might be made by mutual agreement. Based on the 
ooove cited authorities, the specific provisions prevail over the 
~neral provisions. 
Fourth, a contract is to be construed so as to give it meaning 
intended by the parties, and courts will not resort to grammatical 
'iceties or technicalities of punctuation unless they may be util-
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ized to make plain that which is otherwise obscure. 
Weil, 75 N.M. 562, 408 P.2d 140 (1965). 
Fifth, equity will not allow Appellants to accept the 
benefits of an agreement for some nine years and receive and 
accept some $19,000.00 and then resort to sophistry and argu-
ments to avoid their obligations under the option. This Court 
in \\oulsey v. Brown, 539 P. 2d 1035 (Utah 1975) stated: 
Equity will not permit a party to accept 
performance for many years and then claim 
terms contrary to the evidence, as a basis 
to substantiate an assertion of indefinite-
ness, and thus avoid specific performance. 
Id. at 1039. 
The evidence suppc1-rs the trial court's determination that the 
parties had agreed to sell the property and no future agreement 
was necessary. 
Respondent's letter of I-larch 30, 1971 (R. 305) addressed to 
Mrs. Sandberg makes it clear that he will exercise his rights 
with respect to all the property. The Option Agreement described 
land in certain sections and then excluded therefrom land lying 
east of an identified and established fence. 
Mrs. Sandberg testified in her deposition that she and 
Respondent "walked out on the fence and that at that time she 
was insisting that the meandering fence was the boundary of the 
property she was selling, and that Respondent agreed thereto 
(Sandberg depostion p.14-15). Mrs. Sandberg represented to the 
St. George Planing ComI'.1ission in April and :·lay 1971 that R12spo:iJ-
ent was purchasing the property. Mrs. Sandberg on June 7th, 
1971 accepted the $2,000 down payment. Respondent, in his 
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l~tLer of March 30th set forth the calculations showing his entitle-
~ent to a release of 55 acres pursuant to the terms of the Option 
Asreement. Mrs. Sandberg, on June 7th, 1971, conveyed 40 acres. 
Respondent did not require the conveyance of the other fifteen 
acres at that time because he was uncertain as to which other 15 
acres he wished released (Klein Deposition Page 9). More than 7 
;:;onths after the June 7th payment, and after December, 1971, i-!rs. 
Sandberg represented to third persons that Respondent had purchased 
the property (Sandberg Deposition P. 51-52). _§_I The trial court 
found that the Option Agreement of Sept. 21, 1964, was not vague or 
ambiguous and not an agreement to agree (Finding #32 R.379). 
It is obvious from the above-referenced evidence considered by 
the trial court that the parties always intended that the option 
covered all the land in certain described sections, excluding 
therefrom only certain land lying east of a meandering fence and 
that the description prepared by the surveyor and annexed to the 
Real Estate Purchase Agreement properly described the land under 
option. 
The most telling and conclusive evidence of Appellants' under-
standing and intent, however, is found in Appellants' Complaint 
(R. 1) . In Paragraph 8 of the Complaint, Appellants describe the 
real property which is the subject of the action. The description 
ii These representations to third persons after December, 1971, 
that Respondent had purchased the property are significant 
because of a letter sent to Respondent in April of 1972 by 
counsel for Mrs. Sandberg to the effect that the option had 
terminated because Respondent failed to make an option payment 
in December, 1971. Respondent did not make the December, 
1971, payment to keep the option alive because the option had 
been exercised. The statements by Mrs. Sandberg subsequent to 
December, 1971, that Respondent had purchased the property, , 
show that she, too, understood this to be the case and counsel s 
April, 1972, letter was nothing more than a feeble attempt to 
undue something that was otherwise cast in cement. 
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is identical in every respect to the description prepared by the 
surveyor and with respect to ~hich the Rcs?ondent seeks specific 
performance. It is the same property that is described in the 
Earnest Money Receipt. In Paragraph 10 of their Complaint (R. 3) 
the Appellants affirmatively allege that they granted to the Respon:'· 
ent "an option to purchase the subject property." In answer to the 
Complaint, Respondent admitted the allegations of Paragraphs 8 and 
10 thereof (R. 7). Furthermore, Appellants did not raise the issue 
ir. their Motion or in their ~femorandum or Amended Memorandum. It 
is sug;ested ~~~t by such pleading, the description of the property 
covered by the option is not in issue. 
Because of the conduct of rfrs. Sandberg and because of the 
allegations in the Complaint, Respondent has labored under the 
impression that there has never been any doubt or controversy as to 
the description of the real property covered by the option and for 
which Respondent seeks specific performance. It is respectfully 
submitted that the attempt to obsfucate the real intentions and 
agreement of the parties, through a confusing rehash of selected 
and distorted statements and facts and through a tortured interpre-
tation thereof, must fail. 
On pages 45 and 46 of their brief, Appellants suggest that the 
language in the option with respect to the release provision and 
the down payment require mutual future agreement. Based upon the 
authorities cited above which discuss the rules of construction, 
applicable to these circumstances, Appellants' argument of "mutual 
future agreement" is without merit. It is also submitted that a 
-26-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
reasonable reading of the Option Agreement (R.298) will disabuse 
the Court of any such notions. 
On pages 47-49 of their brief ,Appellants quote out of context 
some portions of Respondent's letter to Mrs. Sandberg of March 30, 
~971, and assert that said letter is an acknowledgement that further 
future agreement was required. This contention is simply erroneous. 
As the record shows, the letter indicates some interest and inquiry 
by Respondent to get away from the meandering fence (R.305-307). A 
review of the letter and the circumstances under which it was 
written demonstrate that Respondent was proposing some slight 
modifications to the real property description. Mrs. Sandberg, 
however, insisted upon her contract right that the meandering fence 
was the east boundary of the property being sold (Sandberg Deposi-
tion P.14-15). Following Mrs. Sandberg's rejection of Respond-
ent's proposals, Respondent then proceeded to obtain the legal 
description originally agreed upon by the parties by retaining a 
professional surveyor, Howard Stevens, to complete the survey and 
calculate the acreage of the property in the described sections, 
excluding that lying east of the fence. The record fails to reveal 
that Mrs. Sandberg ever objected to the description proposed by the 
surveyor. 
The Appellants, try as they will, can take little comfort from 
)avison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973) and other 
cases cited by them. In Davison and the other cases cited, there 
~ds not an actual defined description of the property within the 
3ocuments. In this case, the description is set out by sections 
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(excluding property east of an established and identified fenc~; 
The property which is the s•-.1bject of the option is clearl:i cu.pu.blc 
of identification. It was identified in the docu~ents and by the 
survey. Appellants understanding and agreement thereto is evide,,c .. , 
by their Complaint wherein they affirmatively allege and describe 
the particular property optioned to Respondent. 
c. The Option Agreement is Complete. 
On page 52 of their brief, Appellants contend that the Option 
Agreement was not complete because "Schedule A", an exhibit des-
7 / 
cribing the property was to be attached.~ It is true that such 
an exhibit was never prepared nor attached. However, the Earnest 
Money Receipt and ~he Option Agreement contained specific des-
criptions by section numbers and excluded therefrom certain land 
lying east of an identified and established fence. It cannot be 
said that because Schedule A was not attached, the parties had not 
agreed to the description of the lands being purchased. The only 
thing that could be accomplished by attaching the exhibit would be 
to define the fence line. 
Mrs. Sandberg accepted payments over a seven year period 
without complaining about the absence of the exhibit. Mrs. Sandberg. 
and Respondent walked the fence line in the Spring of 1971. Mrs. 
Sandberg, in the Spring of 1971, agreed to a survey to establish a 
metes and bounds description of the fence line and agreed to pay 
_]_/ The option provided that the property was to be 
· · · more particularly described in Schedule A attached 
hereto, to be signed by the parties and made part hereor 
for all purposes. (R.60). 
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c':ie-h~lf of the cost thereof. i·:rs. Sandberg, requested a delay of 
che survey and Respondent agreed to such request. On June 7, 
19~1. :irs. Sandberg accepted the down payment of $2, 000. 00, pre-
~J~ably with knowledge that the non-existent exhibit was not at-
:ached to the Option Agreement. Appellant represented to the St. 
George Planning Commission and thereafter to third parties that she 
Jad sold the property. A survey was completed and an accurate 
sJrvey description was prepared. Appellants did not object thereto. 
Finally, the Appellants made a non-issue of the description by 
alleging in their Complaint that they had granted to Respondent an 
option to acquire the property described in the Complaint. The 
?roperty described in the Complaint is the same property described 
in the documents and surveyed by Howard Stevens, and is the property 
for which Respondent seeks specific performance. 
Deciding a specific performance case, the court in King v. 
Stanlev, 32 C.2d 584, 197 P.2d 321 .(1948) stated: 
Equity does not require that all the terms and 
conditions of the proposed agreement be set 
forth in the contract. The usual and reason-
able conditions of such a contract are, in the 
contemplation of the parties, a part of their 
agreement. In the absence of express conditions, 
custom determines incidental matters relating 
to the opening of an escrow, furnishing deeds, 
title insurance policies, prorating of taxes, 
and the like. Janssen v. Davis, 219 Cal. 783, 
788, 29 P.2d 196; Wagner v. Estathiw, 169 Cal. 
663, 666, 147 P. 561; Bisno v. Herzberg, 75 
Cal.App.2d 235, 241, 170 P.2d 973; O'Donnell v. 
Lutter, 68 Cal.App.2d 376, 838, 156 P.2d 958. 
The material factors to be ascertained from the 
written contract are the seller, the buyer, the 
price to be paid, the time and manner of payment, 
and the property to be transferred, describing it 
so it may be identified. Breckinridge v. Crocker, 
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supra, 78 Cal. 529, 21 P. 179; Grafton v. Cu:nr..ings 
99 U.S. 100, 25 L.Ed. 366; O'Donnell v. Lutter, 
suora, 68 Cal. A.pp.2d 376, 157 P.2d 958. There is 
no.question that these essential items were 
clearly determinable here. Id. at 324. 
\Ji th respect to specific performance, the court in Potter v. 
Bland, 136 C.A.2d 125, 288 P.2d 569 (1955) stated: 
Equity does not require that all the terms and 
conditions of the proposed agreement be set 
forth in the contract. Id. at 573. 
See also: Martin v. Baird, 124 C.A.2d 598, 269 P.2d 54 (1954). 
Likewi3e, this court in Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 
P.2d 893 (1946) helJ :hat a preliminary agreement for sale of an 
apartment house was not so incomplete as to preclude specific 
performance when the essential terms of the contract were ascer-
tainable and were capable of being made certain by extrinsic, parol 
or documentary evidence. This court stated: 
It is elementary that in equity that is cer-
tain which can be made certain. In case 
certain lands are mentioned by name merely 
in a contract, without giving a definite 
description, the lands intended in the con-
tract may always be shown by extrinsic, parol 
or documentary evidence. See also Pomeroy's 
Specific Performance of Contracts, 3rd Ed. 
Sec. 152. Id. at 895. 
Appellants cannot claim that any of the essential terms of the 
option are missing, nor can they contend that the option is incom-
plete in any particular essential to its enforcement. While the 
document was not completed by the attachment of the exhibit, there 
is absolutely no doubt or controversy with respect to the inten-
tions of the parties. It would be inequitable to permit Appellants 
to have the fruits of their bargain for some seven years 
-30-
-\ and tn 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jcny Respondent his rights because of the absence of a simple 
c:.;hibit which, under the existing facts, would neither add to nor 
detract from the contract between the parties. 
POINT VI 
TiiE LAUD DESCRIPTION IS NOT 
AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY 
On pages 53-63 of their brief, Appellants engage in a series 
of suppositional and mythical diagrams that are not in the record 
which they claim support the proposition that the land description 
is ambiguous and contradictory. If Appellants' suppositions and 
speculations are intended to confuse rather than clarify, they have 
succeeded. Their bald assertions and speculative diagrams are not 
supported by the record. Therefore, the only sensible response 
•.·1ithin the reasonable limitation of this brief is to say that "it 
isn't so" and to then state facts that are supported by the record. 
The facts in the record and the· reasonable inferences to be drawn 
' therefrom clearly demonstrate that there is no amgibuity or contra-
diction with respect to the land description in this case. 
Prior to any discussion of this issue raised by Appellants the 
Court should note tuo important things. First, at no time in the 
proceedings before the trial court did Appellants raise any issue 
respecting an ambiguous and contradictory land description. This 
' ~urt has always held, without exception, that it will not consider 
an issue which was not considered by the court below and which is 
:aised for the first time on appeal. Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 
29 Utah 2d 259, 508 P. 2d 528 (1973); State By and Through Road Com-
_i:;sion v. Lukin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. 
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Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1970); In re Ekker's Estnte, 
19 Utah 2d 414, 432 P.2d 45 (1967; Riter v. Cavias, 19 l!tah 2d 353, 
431 P.2d 788 (1967). 
Second, the land description is a non-issue. In their Com-
plaint Appellants affirmatively allege that they granted to Res~ond­
ent an opti0n on the property specifically described in their 
Cornplaint--the same property for which Respondent seeks specific 
performance. This affirmative acknmvledgrnent by Appellants of the 
land under option should be dispositive of the controversy over 
description. Appellants should not be allowed, for the first time 
on appeal, to raise an issue that controverts their own pleadings 
in the case. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is considered necessary in 
view of the confusion created by Appellants' brief to comment 
further. 
The Earnest Money Agreement of April, 1962 (R.294), describes 
the optioned property as follows: 
All land owned by the sellers in 
Sections 21, 22 and 27, 7ownship 42 
South, Range 15 West, S.L.M., consisting, 
so far as the parties can determine at 
this time of approximately 500 acres not 
including any water or water rights, and less 
the following: 
There is now a reservoir constructed by the 
City of St. George on what the parties 
believe to be the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 
22, and there is an old fence running north 
and south west of this reservoir. The sellers 
intend to reserve from said sale all land 
in said Section 22 which lies east of said 
fence line, it being understood that the 
exact line will have to be determined if and 
when the option hereinafter mention is 
executed. 
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The Option Agreement of September, 1964 (R.298), describes the 
optioned property as follows: 
. the Sellers do hereby ratify the 
option granted to the Buyer on June 14, 
1962, and which is hereby formally granted, 
agreed to and acknowledged as an option to 
purchase all land owned by the Sellers in 
Section 21, Section 22, and Section 27 of 
Township 42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, consisting of approximately 
500 acres, which property shall be more particu-
larly described in Schedule A attached hereto, 
to be signed by the parties and made a part hereof 
for all purposes; not including any water or 
water rights, and excluding all land in the 
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one 
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the 
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest 
of the City of St. George reservoir, said 
excluded property also to be more particularly 
described in Schedule A attached hereto and made 
a part hereof for all purposes. 
The variance in the descriptions is that the Earnest Money 
Keceipt excludes all land lying east of the fence in Section 22, 
while the Option Agreement excludes the land lying east of the fence 
in the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 22. It 
now appears there was some land in both the Northeast quarter of the 
1 ~ortheast quarter and in the Southeast quarter of the Northeast 
~arter of Section 22. The literal difference, then, is that the 
Earnest Money Receipt by excluding all property in Section 22 east 
of the fence, excluded a small parcel (approximately 30 acres) that 
:~s in the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter, which was 
~t excluded by the description in the Option Agreement. (See 
' ~:ilphical illustration on page 33 (a)). 
The now apparent variance in descriptions is explainable. In 
.·.~ E<lrnest Money Agreement, the assumption and the statement are 
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l 
In summary, 
t 
North 
NE 1/4 SEC. L2 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
the 
the 
I 
/&./ ~iji 40 a. 
Res. 
SE 1/4 
NE 1/4 
40 a. 
~i 
Property of City 
of St. George 
Earnest Money Receipt 
Survey (R. 321), and 
the Real Estate Purchase 
(R.324), and 
the Plaintiffs' Complaint 
roperty of 
Citv of 
\.Jashington 
Only the Option 
Agreement exclu-
sion would not 
have excludea 
this approximate 
30 acres in the 
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 
(R.294), and 
Contract 
(R. 1), and 
(5) the Testimony of Sandberg (Sandberg 
Deposition p .14-15), and 
(6) the Testimony of Klein (Klein Affidavit 
{f22 R.243) 
all demonstrate that all property East of the fence in 
Section 22, i.e., in both the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and the 
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 was to be excluded. 
Only the unnoted scrivener's erroneous description in 
the Option Agreement limited the exclusion to the 
property East of the fence in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4. 
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to the effect that the fence runs north and south at a location 
that is west of an old reservoir that is located in what the 
?arties believe to be the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter 
of Section 22. The property east of the fence is to be excluded. 
The reasonable inference to be drawn is that the property being 
excluded is in the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter. 
\·Jhile not a part of the record, it can be assumed that the scrivener 
of the Option Agreement drew such an inference and provided for an 
exclusion of that property lying east of the fence in the inferred 
Iiortheast quarter of the Northeast quarter, apparently unaware, as 
were the parties, that the fence actually extended into the Southeast 
quarter of the Northeast quarter. Both parties signed the Option 
Agreement. Apparently neither party detected the mechanical error 
by the scrivener. Both parties during the period of September, 
1964, to the filing of Appellants' brief with this Court proceeded 
with the understanding that all property east of the fence was 
excluded. Payments were made and accepted through June of 1971 
without any comment or objection. Seven years after the execution 
of the Option Agreement the parties walked the fence line together 
in the Spring of 1971 and agreed that the fence consituted the east 
boundary. Appellants never objected to the description provided by 
the surveyor. Appellants filed their Complaint on April 8, 1974 
and affirmatively alleged that they had granted an option to Respond-
ent on specifically described real property, which description as 
set forth in the Complaint excludes all property east of the fence. 
llants. in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
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a ~lemorandum and an 1\r.1ended 1lemorandur:i neit~1er of <.vhich cL1ir.1 :1n:: 
disagreement as to the property under option. 
Relying on Appellants' Complaint and pleadin~s which estab-
lished that there was no issue with respect to the description of 
the land under option, Respondent did not make a record in the 
trial court with respect to the explanation of the apparent varianc1 
After the adverse ruling by the trial court Appellant~ counsel 
searched for and discovered and now assert a minor and previously 
unrelied upon and explainable variance as an ambiguity and a con-
tradiction and try to take comfort therein. The record does not 
indicate that the parties were aware of the variance. The claim 
that is now being made is a controversy created for the first time 
by Appellants' counsel and not by the parties. It is submitted 
that the claim is without merit and is raised too late. 
This Court in Johnson v. Jones, 109 Utah 92, 164 P.2d 893 
(1946) decided a specific performance case in which Appellant 
claimed that the property description was uncertain and indefinite. 
The Court rejected these claims and held that the description was 
sufficiently definite and complete when considered in light of 
Appellants own ans\ver in the case and the extrinsic and documentary 
evidence. The Court stated: 
The claim that the preliminary agreement 
is so incomplete and uncertain that an equity 
court should not decree specific performance, 
is based upon six grounds. First, it is argued 
that the property is not definitely and com-
pletely described, since a street address is 
given without indicating in what city, county 
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or state the property is situated. By his 
answer, the defendant admits that he owns the 
property at 124 East Sth South Street in Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, so 
that no uncertainty can arise by reason of owner-
ship of several properties bearing the same 
address. No question arises as to the fact 
that the parties in making such incomplete des-
cription intended to refer to no property other 
than defendant's property at the indicated 
address in Salt Lake City. Appellant's con-
tention in this respect is disposed of by 
prior decisions of this court. In Easton v. 
Thatcher, 7 Utah 99, 25 P. 728, a less specific 
description than the one here involved was 
held not so uncertain as to justify denial of 
a decree. It was there held that extrinsic 
evidence may be introduced to show the exact 
boundaries and location of property mentioned 
in the contract of sale. Cummings v. Nielson, 
42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619, 622, is to the same 
effect. We there said: "It is elementary 
that in equity that is certain which can be 
made certain. In case ,., '" ,., certain lands 
are mentioned by name merely in a contract, 
without giving a definite description, the 
* * * lands intended in the contract may always 
be shown by extrinsic, parol, or documentary 
evidence." See also Pomeroy's Specific Per-
formance of Contracts, 3rd Ed.Sec. 152. 
Id. at 895. (Emphasis added.) 
This cited portion of the Johnson opinion is clearly applicable to 
the facts of the instant case. As in Johnson, the description in 
Appellants' own pleading (Complaint in this case) along with the 
heretofore cited evidence clearly indicates that there was never 
any disagreement respecting the description of the property in 
question. 
Appellants make reference to the proposed annexation plat 
referred to in the letter as if the same were a part of the record. 
Unfortunately, it is not. Appellants distort the record with an 
erroneous quotation from the Klein letter of March 31, 1971 (R.305). 
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Appellants, on page 57 and again on page 98 of their brief, erron-
eously and improperly quote the Klein letter as stating that he ~as 
only annexing, 
"that land which I am in fact buying from you." 
Actually, the letter states, 
"You will note that I am only proposing 
that land be annexed which I am in fact 
buying from you."__!}_/ 
The distinction is important in that it shows not Respondent's 
statement of fact, but his proposal. The proposed annexation plat 
is not a matter of record and what it showed or did not show is a 
matter of conjecture. There is in the record (R.109) a copy not of 
the proposed annexation plat referred to in the letter, but a copy 
of the annexation plat as concluded, which demonstrates that the 
property being retained by Mrs. Sandberg was also included in the 
annexation. The conclusion drawn by Appellants that the annexation 
plats - the missing proposal and the finalized plat - show some 
further variance in legal description is simply not substantiated 
by the record. 
The record clearly shows that the only two descriptions ever 
used were those contained within the Earnest Money Agreement and 
the Option Agreement. The variance has heretofore been explained. 
Appellants discussion about the letter of March 30th and the plats 
relate only to suggestions, proposals and inquiries. The matter 
was concluded on the basis of the description contained within the 
Earnest Money Agreement. It is the same description as that of the 
_!ii It is interesting to note that Appellants' counsel correctly 
quotes the letter on page 90 of their brief. 
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surveyor, Stevens, and the same description which Appellants in 
their Complaint affirmatively allege they have optioned to Respond-
ent. It is also the same land described in the Real Estate Pur-
chase Contract prepared and executed by Respondent and forwarded to 
Appellants. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that Appellants have not demonstrated that the land descriptions 
were vague and contradictory. Rather, the record and the findings 
by the trial court persuasively prove that the description of the 
?roperty optioned to Respondent has never been in doubt. 
POINT VII 
THE OPTION WAS PROPERLY EXERCISED 
At pages 64-80 of their brief, Appellants argue that the 
option was not properly exercised. Appellants contend that in 
order to exercise the option, Respondent was required to execute 
and submit a purchase contract to Mrs. Sandberg prior to June 14, 
1971. They further argue that because no purchase contract was 
submitted to Mrs. Sandberg prior to that date, the option expired, 
unexercised. Appellants neglect to advise the Court that Mrs. 
Sandberg requested that the survey, which was necessary for the 
preparation of the purchase contract in question, be delayed as an 
accomodation to her. The delay requested by Mrs. Sandberg cannot 
now be used to Appellants' advantage. 
This Court in The Boyer Company v. E. Keith Lignell, No. 14442 
(Utah, August 1, 1977) recently reiterated the principle of law 
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that should govern the resolution of this issue. The Court staced 
This Court recognizes the principle of law 
that a party to a real estate listing agree-
ment cannot prevent or interfere with the per-
formance of the agreement and then assert the 
nonperformance as a defense. 
This same principle of law was recognized by this Court in Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P. 2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1977): 
A person cannot avoid liability for the non-
performance of its obligation by placing 
such performance beyond his control by his 
own voluntary act. Furthermore, no one can 
avail himself of the no~ erformance of a con-
ition precedent, who has himse occasioned 
its non-perior~2nce. (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Hoyt v. ~asatch Hornes, 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927, 930 
(1953). In this case, Mrs. Sandberg requested a delay in the 
survey which she knew would delay the preparation of the purchase 
agreement and is now asserting this delay against Respondent. 
On March 30, 1971, Respondent by his letter to Mrs. Sandberg 
clearly indicated that he was exercising the option. He noted her 
prior request for a survey and agreed thereto. He noted that they 
had previously walked the fence line and he proposed a slight 
modification to the description, but agreed to defer to her wishes. 
He calculated the acreage to which he was entitled under the release 
provision and requested a conveyance. As required by the Option 
Agreement, he took credit for only one-half of the option payments 
and stated that: 
Thereafter acreage to be released at the rate 
of $200.00 per acre but with no consideration 
for release of acreage for the $9,000.00 until 
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all of the land has been paid for. The re-
maining money of $9,000.00 to continued (sic) 
throughout contract without benefit of acreage 
release until the $9,000.00 is applied to the 
last payment. (R. 306) 
Respondent then suggested that three things needed to be completed 
in April and May: 
1. Complete survey to determine exact acreage. 
2. Arrive at exact selling price so that exact principal 
payments could be determined. 
3. Prepare land purchase agreement consistent with terms of 
Option Agreement and the accepted number of acres deter-
mined by the survey. (R.305-307) 
On June 7th, Mrs. Sandberg, not wanting to then pay one-half 
of the quoted survey fee of $2,400.00, requested that the survey be 
delayed until 
near the time when she would be receiving the 
first contract payment estimated to be $8,500.00 
in the month of June 1972. (Finding i/16 R. 374-375, 
Klein Affidavit #18 R.341, Stevens Affidavit #5 
R. 264). 
Respondent acquiesced in the request of Mrs. Sandberg. 
On that same date, June 7, 1971, Respondent paid and Mrs. 
Sandberg accepted $2,000.00 with an endorsement on the face of the 
check that it constituted "Down payment to commence June 15th 
agreement, 1971" (R.308). On that same day, June 7, 1971, Mrs. 
Sandberg conveyed to Respondent 40 of the 55 acres to which Respond-
ent was entitled (R. 311). The other 15 acres were not conveyed 
because Respondent was uncertain at that time as to which other 15 
acres he wanted released and conveyed (Klein Deposition P.9). 
During the months of April and May, Mrs. Sandberg represented 
co the St. George City Planning Commission that Respondent was 
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purchasing the property. Sometime after December, 1971, (sor.1c 
seven months after the June 7th payment), Mrs. Sandberg rcprescntL~ 
to third persons that Respondent was purchasing the property. 
The Real Estate Purchase Contract could not be completed unt:'. 
after the survey because the acreage, and the purchase price based 
thereon at $200.00 per acre, could not be calculated. Consequently 
the preparation and execution by Respondent of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract was delayed until May of 1972 when the survey '•las 
completed. Under such circumstances and based on the above cited 
authorities, Appellants cannot be heard to complain of Respondent's 
1 
failure to do that which Mrs. Sandberg's specific request caused 
him not to do. 
The foregoing discussion adequately answers Appellants' con-
tention on page 65 of their brief that the exercise of the Option 
Agreement by Respondent was improper as to form. Respondent did 
everything in his power to exercise the option according to its 
terms. To the extent the option was not exercised in strict ac-
cordance with its terms is directly attributable to Mrs. Sandberg. 
On page 68 of their brief, Appellants cite authority and argue 
that the "exercising documents" were on their face preliminary to 
the exercise of the option. Appellants' argument is confusing at 
best. They cite authorities which deal with options that required 
the exercise thereof to be by written statements, and then attack 
Respondent's March 30, 1971, letter as not complying with the 
various standards discussed in the cited authorities. The fatal 
defect in this argument is that the option in question did not re-
quire a written formal notice in order to exercise the option. 
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Appellants' argument and cited authorities are inapposite. The 
option in this case was to be exercised, as heretofore discussed, 
in a manner that was delayed by Mrs. Sandberg. 
At page 73 of their brief, Appellants argue that the tender of 
the real estate contract in June, 1972, was not timely. This 
argument has been discussed amply above. Under the circumstances 
of Mrs. Sandberg's delay of the survey, the authorities cited above 
make it clear that Appellants may not take advantage of a situation 
caused by Mrs. Sandberg. 
At page 77 of their brief, Appellants argue that the "exer-
cising" documents were in fact a counteroffer. Appellants' cited 
authorities are not on point. As heretofore discussed at pages 27-
28, the letter of March 30th contained some proposals to Mrs. 
Sandberg that were rejected. The record in no way supports Appel-
lants' contentions that the exercise of the option was conditioned 
on any of these proposals. The applicable rule of law in this 
instance was stated by the court in Duprey v. Donahoe, 52 Wash. 2d 
129, 323 P.2d 903 (1958). That court held that where the acceptance 
of an option to purchase realty is in the first instance uncondi-
tional, the acceptance remains unconditional even though a mere 
request is added for a departure from the terms of the option. The 
court stated: 
Both the letter and the oral expression 
made by the optionee established that the 
option was being unconditionally accepted. 
The general rule is that, 
* * * If the optionee attaches conditions 
not warranted by the terms of the option 
to his acceptance or notice of his election 
to buy, this itself amounts to a rejection; 
-42-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
but it is otherwise where the acceptance is in 
the first instance unconditional, and a mere 
request is added for a departure from the 
terms of the option as to the time and place 
of completing the transaction. 55 Am.Jur. 508 
§39. 
To the same effect, 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser 
§10, p.855. Id. at 906. 
Appellants have not and cannot enumerate a single modification that 
resulted from what they characterize as a "counteroffer". The 
rationality of Respondent's proposal to use the quarter section 
line rather than the meandering fence as the east boundary is 
readily apparent from an observation of the graphical illustration 
on page 33(a), supra. The facts are clear that Mrs. Sandberg 
rejected the proposals in Respondent's letter. She thereafter ac-
cepted the $2,000.00 down payment, she conveyed 40 acres to Respond-
ent, she represented to the St. George Planning Commission that 
Respondent was purchasing the property, and seven months after 
accepting the $2,000.00 down payment she represented to third 
persons that Respondent had purchased the property. In view of 
these uncontroverted facts, Appellants' argument that the exercise 
of the option was a counteroffer that was never accepted is totallv 
without merit. 
POINT VIII 
HUTUALITY IS PRESENT 
Appellants commence their section on mutuality by rehashing 
earlier sections of their brief on alternative contract provisions, 
vagueness and ambiguity. Respondent has treated these subjects 
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eJrlier in this brief and will not repeat the same here.-2_/ 
\.fuile Appellants' argument on mutuality fails to distinguish 
between mutuality of obligation and mutuality of remedy, there is 
no problem in this case because both are present. 
Appellants' argument implies that equivalance is required 
between the parties in order to have a valid contract. Neither 
mutuality of obligation nor mutuality of remedy requires equiva-
lance. This Court in Allen v. Rose Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah 608, 
237 P. 2d 823, 825 (1951) stated: 
Moreover, a contract does not lack mutuality 
merel because its terms are harsh or its 
ob igations unequal, or ecause every o iga-
tion of one party is not met by an equivalent 
counter obligation of the other party. 
(Emphasis in original) 
Likewise, with respect to mutuality of remedy, this Court stated 
in Genola Town v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P.2d 903, 934 (1938): 
The development of the doctrine of mutuality 
as to remedy reveals that it was founded on 
the idea that one party should not have from 
equity what the other party could not have 
_J_/ The only authorities cited by Appellants in this section of 
their brief do not deal with mutuality but with arguments 
previously discussed. At page 82 of their brief, Appellants 
again cite and explain the Kline v. Rogerson decision. Again, 
Appellants have misrepresented the holding of that case. That 
case and its holding are explained on page 21 of this brief. 
At pages 82-83 of their brief, Appellants cite this Court's 
decision in Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P.1101 
(1926), which is neither factually nor legally applicable to 
the instant case. Unlike the facts of the instant case in 
which formal written agreements between the parties extended 
over 9 years, the Court in Candland v. Oldroyd was dealing 
with the very basics of contract formation. In Candland, this 
Court held that there was no contract between the parties 
because of a defective acceptance of an offer to sell. In the 
instant case, Appellants can make no such claim. Mrs. Sandberg 
accepted $19,000.00 over a period of nine years, including a 
do1vn payment on the very contract in question. 
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obtained had it applied. The doctrine that 
at the time of making of the contract there 
must be mutual fixed obliFations is not tenable. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mutuality consists of the obligation of each party to do, or 
permit something to be done, in consideration of the act or promise 
of the other. 17 C.J.S. Contracts §lOO(l)(a)(l963). 
This Court in the ~llen case, supra, speaking of mutuality, 
equated it with consideration and stated: 
(e) The argument that there is no 
mutuality of obligation in the instant case 
simply conveys the objection that the defend-
ant's promise of employment, being terminable 
at will, is not sufficient consideration to 
sustain the negative covenant. Professor 
Williston states that "no briefer definition 
of sufficient consideration in a bilateral 
contract can be given than this: Mutual 
promises in each of which the promisor under-
takes some act or forbearance that will be, or 
apparently may be, detrimental to the promisor 
or beneficial to the promisee, and neither of 
which is void, are sufficient consideration for 
one another. Williston on Contracts, Revised 
Edition, Volume I, §103 F. (Emphasis added.) 
In this case, Appellants had promised to sell the land and by 
such promise subjected themselves to an action for Specific Per-
formance. Respondent had promised to purchase the land, had paid 
$17,000.00 in option payments, had exercised the option and had 
made a $2,000.00 doi;·m payment. Respondent had further agreed and 
promised that in the event of his default, he would forfeit the 
payments made. 
On page 84 of their brief, Appellants ask: "The salient 
question is, what would a court have found had Mrs. Sandberg sued, 
alleging the Option Agreement and the letter and check as a con-
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tract against Klein?" The answer can be given without hesitation: 
Mrs. Sandberg would have had the contractual default remedies 
available to her. 
The Earnest Money Receipt provides, 
Said contract shall contain the usual pro-
vision for forfeiture in the event of 
default by the buyer . (R.295) 
Paragraph Sf of the Option Agreement which "ratified" (R.298) 
the option set forth in the Earnest Money Receipt provides, 
f. In the event of default by the Buyer 
under the Option Agreement or under the Con-
tract to Purchase, such land as has not been 
conveyed by deed to buyer shall revert to the 
Seller, and any advance payment as of such 
time of default shall be forfeited by the 
buyer and remain the property of the seller 
as liquidated damages. (R.301,302) 
It is seen from the documents that the seller's remedy in the 
event of a default of the buyer is that of a forfeiture of the con-
sideration paid by the buyer. This right of the seller to forfeit 
the buyer's payments in the event of his default was not lost to 
the seller by the absence of a formal contract on or before June 14, 
1971. There is no conceivable fact situation under the documents 
where the Appellants ever lost or will ever lose the right to de-
clare a forfeiture in the event of default. 
Appellants note on page 84 of their brief that there is not a 
signed copy of the March 30th letter in the file. The record is 
clear that Respondent delivered the letter. The record is likewise 
clear that Mrs. Sandberg received the letter. Since the letter was 
delivered to and received by Mrs. Sandberg, it must be presumed 
that she has the original thereof. With respect to Appellants' 
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argument on mutuality the presence or absence of the letter seems 
of little import. Respondent's promise to forfeit did not in anv 
way depend upon the not yet executed contract nor the letter. 
POI:H IX 
SPECIFIC PERFORHANCE IS THE 
ONLY REMEDY AND HAS PROPER 
The matters set forth in subsections a., b., c. and d. on pages 
87 through 93 of Appellants' brief are repetitious and have been 
previously discussed. Respondent has countered each of these argu-
ments at least once in the foregoing pages of this brief. In surnrnar 
it can be said that Respondent exercised the option in June of 1971 
with a notation on his June 7th check that it constituted 
down payment to cormnence June 15th agreement, 
1971 
and that Mrs. Sandberg accepted the same. 
Appellants on page 94 of their brief in the subsection e. call 
to the Court's attention a mathematical error. In his letter of 
March 30, Respondent stated that he had previously paid $18,000.00. 
The evidence now is that he had paid at that time only $17,000.00 
and that with the down payment he had paid a total of $19,000.00 anc 
not $20,000.00. The error was first discovered late during the 
course of this litigation. Appellants are certainly entitled to 
a correction and a principal balance due of $67,368.00 and not 
$66,368.00. Respondent so stipulates. 
Respondent asserts, however, that under the facts and circurn-
stances, the mathematical error does not justify the reversal of 
the trail court's Judgment. It was an error in the March 30th 
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letter to which Mrs. Sandberg didn't object. She accepted the 
$2,000.00 down payment some two months after receipt of the letter. 
Her counsel in the pre-litigation correspondence never asserted the 
~athematical error as a reason for refusing to proceed. Appellants' 
counsel never raised the issue with the trial court. While we do 
not minimize the value of one thousand dollars, the legal effect of 
the one thousand dollar error under the circumstances of this case 
is de minimus and is easily repaired. 
Equity should deny to Appellants the relief they now claim for 
the mathematical error. 
CONCLUSION 
Specific Performance is an equitable remedy. Respondent 
submits that an objective view of the equities involved will compel 
the conclusion that the Judgment of the Trial Court ordering 
Specific Performance should be affirmed. 
Respondent faithfully performed the terms of the Earnest Money 
Receipt and the Option Agreement. He timely made every payment 
provided for therein and those payments were accepted by Mrs. 
Sandberg. Respondent caused the property to be annexed to the City 
of St. George. He caused the property to be surveyed and paid for 
the survey. In March of 1971, some nine (9) years after the Earnest 
Money Receipt and some seven (7) years after the Option Agreement, 
and after making two (2) payments each year, totaling $17,000.00, 
Respondent advised Mrs. Sandberg that he would be exercising the 
option in June of 1971. He requested her cooperation in completing 
the survey. He paid to the County of Washington a $100. 00 fee for 
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the establishment of a survey marker. He paid and '!rs. Sandt>cq; 
accepted on June 7, 1971, a $2,000.00 down payment to exercise th~ 
option and to put the contract into effect. He acquiescc:>d in the 
request of Mrs. Sandberg that the survey be delayed, thereby delay-
ing the completion of a formal contract. In April of 1972, when 
Respondent discovered Mrs. Sandberg's reluctance to proceed with 
the survey, he took the initiative, ordered the survey, paid for 
the same, prepared a contract and signed it and forwarded the same 
to Mrs. Sandberg, together with the first required annual payment 
almost one month before the first annual payment was due under the 
terms of the Option Asreement and the anticipated contract. 
It is obvious from the foregoing that Respondent proceeded 
with good faith, in making payments, making arrangements for the 
annexation, arranging and paying for the survey and preparing and 
signing the contract and by doing every proper possible thing he 
could to exercise his rights and to see the purchase of the pro-
perty to a conclusion. 
In contrast, the position of Appellants is entirely devoid of 
equities. Mrs. Sandberg accepted $19,000 over a period of nine (9) 
years. The final $2,000.00 was accepted June 7, 1971, as the down 
payment required by the terms of the option to exercise the same. 
Mrs. Sandberg acknowledged that the option had been exercised by 
releasing and conveying 40 acres to Respondent. She watched, 
urged, supported and cooperated '"ith Respondent with respect to 
annexing and surveying matters. She filed an inventory and ap-
praisement in the matter of the Estate of Wayne Sandberg which 
neglected to reflect the contract rights of Respondent and she 
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r~quested a delay in the survey. Sometime after December, 1971, 
she stated to others that Respondent had purchased the property. 
Then, in May of 1972, some ten (10) years after the original 
Earnest Money Receipt and after receipt by her of $19,000.00, did 
~rs. Sandberg first assert that Respondent's rights had terminated. 
The legal technicalities, niceties, arguments and sophistry 
set forth in the 103 page brief of Appellants do not support the 
conclusions claimed by Appellants and they certainly do not change 
the equities. To grant to Appellants the relief sought by them to 
quiet title and to forfeit the Respondent's payments and his 
efforts and expenses with respect to the property would be inequit-
able and unjust in the extreme. 
It is only equitable that this Court affirm the Judgment and 
Decree of Specific Performance made and entered by the Trial Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this .:2-{ day of August, 1977. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
~L\··~ (J Jam" p coC~) 
By&r(~ 
All an T. Br iTikeihOff 
310 South Main Street, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 363-3300 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT 
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CER:IFICA7E OF ~~ILI~G 
The undersigned hereby certifies that ~e served two (2) 
,:_;:c:'._es of t\ce foregoing :SRIEF OF RESPO:~DE::T U?On Appellants 
~e=e~n bv ~ailing copies hereof, first class, postage prepaid, 
to their attorney ~ichael D. Hughes of Allen, Thoopson, Hughes 
~ 3e~le, 148 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 84770, this 
"),..- q day of August, 1977. 
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